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LOCAL TAXATION OF CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
David W. Smith*
As the cable television industry matures,' so do its problems. The latest,
and one of the most important, involves consideration of the ever increasing
tax burden laid on cable by state and local governments, and whether or not
such taxation violates the United States Constitution.
The problem was highlighted and summarized in a recent Federal Com-
munications Commission decision, 2 issued as a result of applications filed by
a California cable television company and the Florida Cable Television Asso-
ciation which sought a declaratory ruling that certain taxes3 were in violation
of the Commission's regulations. 4 Without expressing its rationale, the Com-
* Member, Pryor, Cashman & Sherman, New York City; Adjunct Associate Pro-
fessor of Political Science, C.W. Post College; Adjunct Assistant Professor of Paralegal
Studies, New York University School of Continuing Education. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1955; J.D., Fordham University, 1958. The author is indebted to Henry
G. Ferraioli, Associate, Hawkins, Delafield & Woods, for his invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. From 1963 to 1973 the industry showed a 22.6 percent compounded growth rate
in total number of systems. As of January 1974 there were 3,033 cable systems serving
about 25 million people, or roughly 11 percent of the households in America. CABLE
TEEvlSION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE DATA 1 (1974).
2. Cable TV Taxes, 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 457 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
CATV Taxes].
3. The taxes at issue were a five percent use tax imposed upon subscribers to mu-
nicipal cable television service, Stockton, Cal., Ordinance 1837-C.S. § 8-076, June 26,
1969, and a tax by municipalities upon purchasers of cable television service of up to
10 percent of the purchase price as authorized by a Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 166.231 (Supp. 1975).
4. The petitioners sought to have the tax declared invalid as a violation of the
franchise standards established by the FCC. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1975). The provi-
sion reads, in relevant part:
(b) The franchise fee shall be reasonable (e.g., in the range of 3-5 percent
of the franchisee's gross subscriber revenues per year from cable television op-
erations in the community (including all forms of consideration, such as initial
lump sum payments)). If the franchise fee exceeds 3 percent of such reve-
nues, the cable television system shall not receive Commission certification un-
til the reasonableness of the fee is approved by the Commission on showings,
by the franchisee, that it will not interfere with the effectuation of Federal reg-
ulatory goals in the field of cable television, and, by the franchising authority
that it is appropriate in light of the planned local regulatory program.
47 C.F.R. § 76.31(b) (1975).
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mission declared that such taxes do not violate the franchise compensation
limitations.
The opinion went beyond this holding, however, to discuss the more basic
problem of whether similar kinds of taxation violated the equal protection
clause, commerce clause, or free speech provisions of the Constitution. The
Commission's concern stemmed from the fear that imposition of such taxes
could severely limit the development of cable and prevent it from becoming
an effective contributor "in furthering the objectives of the Communications
Act."5
It is apparent, at least at present, that the sympathies of the Commission
are on the side of cable. As a result, -the opinion oversimplifies the issues
and tends to paint the situation in black and white rather than in various
shades of grey, a treatment which would be more befitting of the complex
constitutional issues involved. 6
The purpose of this article is to elaborate and clarify the very difficult
questions raised by the Commission in its decision in Cable TV Taxes. To
understand and analyze the problem fully, it is first necessary to explore the
true nature of cable television. In the first section, it is suggested that cable
as it exists today is the functional equivalent of an over-the-air broadcaster.
This conclusion results from viewing cable through the integrated perspective
of the Commission's regulatory scheme, the approach of the courts to cable
systems, and the types of service the system itself provides.
The second section deals with the constitutional issues raised by local taxa-
tion of cable. The regulatory rationale of state and local legislatures appears
to be that cable is identical to various utilities. That such an approach
denies cable equal protection of the law is demonstrated by the system's
broadcast nature; thus, laws which equate cable with telephone, gas, and
5. CATV Taxes 460. The Commission also has said:
Broadcast signals are being used as a basic component in the establishment
of cable systems, and it is therefore appropriate that the fundamental goals of
a national communications structure be furthered by cable-the opening of new
outlets for local expression, the promotion of diversity in television pro-
gramming, the advancement of educational and instructional television, and in-
creased informational services of local governments.
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190 (1972).
6. While the majority opinion oversimplifies the issues in favor of cable, Commis-
sioner Hook's concurrence, which challenges the majority's view of the possible infirmi-
ties of state taxation of cable systems, likewise does not provide a complete analysis of
the applicable constitutional principles. See CATV Taxes 467 (Robinson, Comm'r, con-
curring and dissenting). Chairman Wiley's separate statement can be viewed as sup-




electric companies are unreasonable. Indeed, any economic regulation of
cable is arbitrary if it does not also include over-the-air broadcasters.
Application of the commerce clause to these problems is not an easy
matter. Cable is engaged in interstate commerce, and there does not appear
to be any doubt that state and local taxes inhibit the growth of cable systems.
Moreover, there is ample precedent showing that local taxation of companies
engaged in interstate communications violates the commerce clause. 7 Never-
theless, there is also ample precedent establishing that companies engaged
in interstate activity must still bear their share of local taxes.8 Thus, the out-
come of this question will depend on the type of tax or taxes involved and
the ability of the system to show that real economic harm has occurred to
itself and, perhaps, to the rest of the industry in the same state.
Economic impact is an integral part of the first amendment question of
whether or not local taxes infringe upon free speech. At least two facets of
free speech, the right of the cable system to disseminate news and information
and the right of the public to receive it, are involved. A review of recent
Supreme Court decisions indicates that there may be a third aspect of free
speech applicable only to cable: the constitutional right of the public to use
cable's access facilities as a means of self-expression. Again, the cable sys-
tem will have to establish that the effect of the local taxation is regressive
and that it inhibits or prevents further development of'the system. The
courts will then have to balance the local government's right to tax against
the impairment of free speech which results.
I. THE NATURE OF CABLE TELEVISION
Cable television is the functional equivalent of the broadcast medium. In an
analysis of cable's past history and present circumstances, even with regard
,to the telephonic and data -transmission services which are speculated upon
for the future, its broadcast nature predominates. 9
Except for two copyright cases'0 which are limited in their applicability,
7. See pp. 766-67 & notes 63-66 infra.
8. See p. 767 & notes 67, 68 & 78 infra.
9. The essence of cable service is broadcasting. The Communications Act of 1934
defines broadcasting as "the dissemination of radio communications intended to be re-
ceived by the public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations." 47 U.S.C. §
153(o) (1970). A cable system disseminates broadcast signals which it either originates
itself or picks up off-the-air. The fact that a viewer must subscribe to the cable service
before he or she can receive these signals does not make the cable system any less a
broadcaster than the fact that the viewer must buy a television set to receive over-the-
air signals.
10. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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there has not yet been a clear judicial definition of cable. The Commission
itself has ducked the issue by describing cable as 'a "hybrid."" But cer-
tain things are clear: cable competes directly with over-the-air broad-
casters;'2 the right of the FCC to regulate the industry is based on its author-
ity to regulate broadcasters;' 3 and even the Commission now refers to cable
as an alternative to over-the-air broadcasting. 14
The Commission's equivocation in trying to define cable television parallels
its overall efforts in trying to regulate the industry. Despite the fact that
such history is marked by inconsistency, contradiction, and uncertainty, it does
reflect, in a not unfavorable light, the attempt of a regulatory agency to grow
and to maintain flexibility as new technology rapidly changed the face of the
industry being regulated.
Originally the Commission determined that it did not have jurisdiction over
the cable industry. 15 But as the competitive nature of cable grew more trou-
blesome, the Commission sought congressional guidance.' 6 With no guidance
forthcoming, but with a growing realization of how serious, and possibly
destructive, the competition with over-the-air broadcasters could become, the
Commission exercised indirect jurisdiction by imposing restrictions on com-
mon carrier microwave facilities serving cable systems.1 7
11. "We reaffirm our view that cable systems are neither broadcasters nor common
carriers within the meaning of the Communications Act. Rather, cable is a hybrid that
requires identification and regulation as a separate force in communications." Cable
Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 211 (1972).
12. In such a situation, where some television service is available over-the-air,
cable television operations must compete in the marketplace by supplementing
the existing over-the-air television service. Thus, cable television systems may
offer their subscribers better reception, more signals, origination cablecasting,
etc. It is for this supplemental service that cable television subscribers pay.
And, where over-the-air reception is available, cable television and local
broadcast television must compete for the attention of the viewing public.
CATV Taxes 465.
13. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
14. "Where, as in Florida, cable television is classified as a public utility and substan-
tial taxes are levied on the service on the basis of that classification, and the alternative
service, broadcasting, is excluded from such tax liability, serious questions are raised."
CATV Taxes 465-66.
15. Report and Order on CATV and IV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
16. See, e.g., H.R. 6840, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
17. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Commission's denial of an application to build
microwave facilities on the ground that the granting of the application would place an
economic burden on a local television station.
[Vol. 24:755
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As a result of rulemaking proceedings which commenced in 1962, the
Commission eventually promulgated a series of rules governing cable systems
served by microwave.' Although these rules were limited, the Commission
did recognize the full extent of cable's competitive thrust against over-the-air
broadcasters1" and declined to regulate cable as a common carrier, choosing
instead to regulate it in such a way as to control its competitive impact on
over-the-air broadcasters. 20
Such a hesitant mode of regulation, however, did little to resolve the prob-
lems regarding competition. Finally, in 1968, the Commission reversed its
original position that it had no jurisdiction over cable and promulgated a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for the entire industry.21 This reversal re-
flected an awareness that cable was not merely a competitive threat, but an
independent communications force engaged in the origination and transmis-
sion of broadcast signals.
The Commission's regulatory scheme is a recognition of cable's position in
broadcasting. Systems are made subject to many of the same rules that apply
to over-the-air broadcasters. These include the equal time provisions, 22 the
fairncss doctrine requirements, 23 lottery and gambling restrictions,2 4 and pro-
hibitions against the broadcast of obscene and indecent material. 25  In
addition, there are rules governing the kinds of broadcasting a cable system
can transmit. These rules are attributable to its unique technology and in-
18. First Report and Order on Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
19. "Mhe likelihood or probability of [cable's] adverse impact upon potential and
existing [broadcast] service has become too substantial to be dismissed." Id. at 713-14.
20. See Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.
1966), in which the court upheld the position taken by the Commission that regulating
cable systems as an adjunct of the broadcasting industry rather than as common carriers
was appropriate. The court stated:
In a statutory scheme in which Congress has given an agency various bases
of jurisdiction and various tools with which to protect the public interest, the
agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing which jurisdictional base and
which regulatory tools will be most effective in advancing the Congressional
objective.
Id. at 284.
21. Second Report and Order on CATV, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). This exercise of
regulatory jurisdiction eventually was affirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The rules remain subject to continuing
review and revision. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143
(1972); Reconsideration of Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 326
(1972).
22. 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (1975).
23. Id. § 76.209.
24. Id. § 76.213.
25. Id. § 76.215.
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clude "pay-cable" regulations,2 6 signal carriage and nonduplication rules, 27
and access channel requirements. 28
Nowhere was the Commission's attitude that cable is a broadcast medium
more pronounced than in its mandatory origination requirement. Systems
having 3,500 or more subscribers were obligated to originate a significant
amount of their own programming. 29 Even though this rule has since been
revoked, the substitute rule promulgated by the Commission requires sys-
tems to provide a certain amount of origination equipment and facilities for
the users of access channels.30 Thus the rules still emphasize the broadcast
nature of cable.
The authority of the FCC to regulate cable grows out of those powers
which are "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commis-
sion's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. ' 'z 1
It has used these powers to assert rather than deemphasize the broadcast
nature of cable. Thus the Supreme Court, in upholding the Commission's
authority to mandate origination, appears to have impliedly adopted the func-
tional equivalency concept when it stated: "More important, CATV systems,
no less than broadcast stations . . . may enhance as well as impair the appro-
priate provision of broadcast services." '32
Courts have never had difficulty in finding that cable systems, like over-
the-air broadcasters, are engaged in interstate commerce ."3  This is true re-
gardless of whether the signals carried by the system are interstate or
intrastate or whether all of the system's equipment is located in the same
state.3 4 Nor has the resemblance of cable's physical plant to that of a tele-
26. Id. § 76.225.
27. Id. §H 76.54-76.65,
28. Id. § 76.251.
29. Id. § 76.201, deleted, 39 Fed. Reg. 43310 (1974).
30. 47 C.F.R. § 76.253 (1975).
31. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
32. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 664-65 (1972).
33. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Buck-
eye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), in which
the Court stated:
Nor can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communica-
tion, even where, as here, the intercepted signals emanate from stations located
within the same state in which the CATV system operates. We may take no-
tice that television broadcasting consists in very large part of programming de-
vised for, and distributed to, national audiences; respondents thus are ordinarily
employed in the simultaneous retransmission of communications that have very
often originated in other states. The stream of communication is essentially
uninterrupted and properly indivisible. To categorize respondents' activities as
[Vol. 24:755
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phone system altered the basic character of cable's business. Early decisions
uniformly refused to equate cable with telephone service.3 5 Methodology
and technology have been considered irrelevant; rather, the character of the
communication has been deemed probative of the nature of the business. 36
The Supreme Court has sought to distinguish cable systems from broad-
casters in only two decisions, both of which involved questions of copyright
infringement. 37 These cases, however, did not deal with the nature of cable.
The narrow commercial issue was whether the reception and retransmission
function of cable constitutes a "performance" of over-the-air signals within
the meaning of the Copyright Act.38  Other services offered by cable were
deemed irrelevant; the Court isolated, examined, and discussed only the re-
transmission function.39 Yet it is elementary that in defining the nature of
a business one does not examine each part separately.
Cable television is the sum of all its parts, as the Commission itself recently
recognized. 40  At this moment, the sum of cable's parts-retransmission,
origination, importation, access, pay cable-reflects a system which is the
functional equivalent of a broadcaster. That services such as data transmis-
intrastate would disregard the character of the television industry, and serve
merely to prevent the national regulation that "is not only appropriate but es-
sential to the efficient use of radio facilities."
Id. at 168-69.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1964);
Pahoulis v. United States, 242 F.2d 345 (3d Cir. 1957); Lilly v. United States, 238 F.2d
584 (4th Cir. 1956). Both Lilly and Pahoulis presaged the Supreme Court's approach
in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court treated CATV as an extension of the television set.
36. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 888 (1969). Technology and methodology were also considered to be irrelevant
by the Supreme Court in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415
U.S. 394 (1974), and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968), both copyright cases.
37. See cases cited note 10 supra.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970).
39. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974), in which the Court stated that "we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in
determining that the development and implementation of these new functions . . . are
simply extraneous to a determination of copyright infringement liability.... ".Id. at
405.
40. In Cable Television Service Rules, 49 F.C.C.2d 1078 (1974), the Commission
noted:
That cable is an "organic whole" should be obvious. Without the broadcast
signal complement allowed by our rules, there would be no cable. It is also
becoming clear to this Commission that without the additional services includ-
ing leased access, either mandated or allowed by our rules, cable will not be
able to develop a strong enough package of services to achieve our goal of a
nationwide broadband communications grid.
Id. at 1083.
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sion, meter reading, and the like may be added to cable in the future might
make some of the services it offers similar to that of a telephone company,
but at present, with its services geared solely for television, the organic whole
of cable is broadcasting.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
A. Equal Protection
Among other things, the equal protection clause protects an individual from
discriminatory state action that imposes a tax liability on one person while
not imposing the same tax on others of the same class. 41 It requires that
in defining a class subject to legislation the distinctions made to separate this
class from any other similar class have "some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made."'42
Because a cable system is essentially a broadcaster, it is deceptively easy
to assume that any attempt to tax it which did not also tax overhe -air broad-
casters and possibly other forms of mass communication, would be a denial
of equal protection. State statutes dealing with fiscal and tax regulation are
accorded a presumption of constitutionality, 48 however, and accordingly the
41. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
42. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). See also Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In Lindsley, the Court expressed four criteria used
to measure legislation against the equal protection clause:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits
of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what
is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely
arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification
in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be con-
ceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the
law was enacted must 'be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
id. at 78-79.
43. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). In McGowan, the Court described the scope of this
presumption, saying:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
ceived to justify it.
366 U.S. at 425-26 (citations omitted).
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burden of proving the statute unconstitutional is upon the challenger. 44 This
presumption of constitutionality makes it extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, to upset a taxing statute on equal protection grounds.45
Since legislative action differs from state to state, the focus of an equal
protection analysis will vary from case to case. Depending on the draftsman-
ship and the intent of the statute, apparently similar enactments may be valid
in one jurisdiction and void in another. In essence, then, the central concern
of an equal protection analysis will be whether the legislature has classified
cable in an arbitrary manner. Cable will carry the substantial burden of both
educating the courts on the nature of its business and establishing the con-
tention that it has been afforded discriminatory treatment.46
Thus far, taxing statutes seem to regularly classify cable with the tele-
phone, gas, and electric industries. 47  The rationale for including cable sys-
tems with these utilities is never made explicit. Three theories for inclusion,
all of which are based on characteristics shared by each of the industries,
seem plausible: the legislators view cable either as a utility, a monopoly, or
a form of communication by wire. Each of these must be examined to dis-
tinguish cable for purposes of taxation.
Cable is not a utility in the traditional sense, as is telephone, gas, or electric
service. Unlike a true utility that furnishes a necessity and receives a fair rate
of return on its investment, a cable system's income is uncertain and its rate
of return generally zero. While it can be argued that cable is a utility
in the sense that it is engaged in a business impressed with a public interest,48
44. See, e.g., Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
45. Cf. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 368-72 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV.
1065, 1087 (1969).
46. In evaluating the challenge to the statute at issue in Lindsley v. National Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Supreme Court stated:
In thus criticising the bill [in equity], we do not mean that its allegations are
alone to be considered, for due regard also must be had for what is within the
range of common knowledge and what is otherwise plainly subject to judicial
notice. . . . But we rest our criticism upon the fact that the bill is silent in
respect of some matters which, although essential to the success of the present
contention, are neither within the range of common knowledge nor otherwise
plainly subject to judicial notice. So, applying the rule that one who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it is
arbitrary, we properly might dismiss the contention without saying more.
Id. at 79-80 (citations omitted).
47. See, e.g., ordinance and statute cited note 3 supra.
48. See, e.g., TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), aff'd, 396
U.S. 556 (1970); Staminski v. Romeo, 62 Misc. 2d 1051, 310 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). In the TV Pix decision, the district court noted that
the apparatus of the community antenna system is an appendage to the primary
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
the same may be said of the over-the-air broadcaster.4 9
Nor is cable a true monopoly. While the economics of the cable business
make it unlikely that there will be two cable companies competing with each
other on the same block,50 cable does compete with over-the-air broadcasters.
Gas, electric, and telephone companies do not compete with other similar
companies or associated entities that provide the same service. These com-
panies possess a true monopolistic status; the balance sheet alone belies that
status for cable service. While an over-the-air broadcaster may be con-
sidered to have a monopoly over the airwaves it uses, 5' it does not enjoy a
monopolistic status in the marketplace. A cable system operates in the same
marketplace as the broadcaster; the two systems compete for viewers.
While cable provides communication by wire as does telephone, this
observation immediately excludes a similar analogy to gas and electricity, and
does not give consideration to the dissimilar character of the types of com-
munication at issue. A cable system deals exclusively in broadcast signals
while telephone delivers all variety of messages. The courts and the FCC
have recognized the distinction between the two types of communication by
holding that cable does not provide telephone services. 52
interstate broadcasting facilities with incidents much more local than national,
involving cable equipment through the public streets and ways, local franchises,
local intra-state advertising and selling of services and local intra-state collec-
tions. In this perspective, a community antenna system is essentially a local
business.
304 F. Supp. at 463.
49. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966), in which Judge Burger, speaking for the majority, stated:
True it [an over-the-air broadcaster] is not a public utility in the same sense
as strictly regulated common carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it
a purely private enterprise like a newspaper or an automobile agency. A
broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper publisher, but he is not
in the same category in terms of public obligations imposed by law.
Id. at 1003. Cf. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. FCC, 106 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
rev'd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249
(D.C. Cir. 1937); State ex rel. Pruzan v. Redman, 60 Wash. 2d 521, 374 P.2d 1002
(1962). In the Pruzan case, the Washington Supreme Court decided that a radio broad-
casting station was "a public utility in a limited sense impressed with a public interest."
Id. at 527, 374 P.2d at 1006. There were, in fact, efforts during the passage of the
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162, the forerunner of the Communications
Act of 1934, to make radio a full public utility. See H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1926) (minority report); 67 CONG. REc. 5483 (1926) (remarks of Represen-
tative Davis).
50. This has happened, however. See Application of Babylon TV Cable Corp., No.
10508 (N.Y. State Comm'n on Cable Television, 1974), wherein a municipality author-
ized two cable companies to compete in the same area and the State Commission ap-
proved.
51. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969).
52. See cases cited note 35 supra.
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The "communication by wire" classification raises a number of other issues
which suggest that it is inaccurate. One question goes to the breadth
of the classification, since the logic that would equate cable with tele-
phone could extend to include a simple master antenna setup in an apartment
or office building or even to a hotel that shows closed circuit movies to its
patrons.53  In each instance, there is "communication by wire." Other ques-
tions raised by this grouping concern the importance of ownership of the
"wire" used to communicate. Does it make a difference whether the system
owns the wire or merely leases it, and if it does matter, is this a rational dif-
ference for purposes of taxation? If the use of telephone wire by a cable
system is sufficient to make the analogy for legislative purposes, should not
the same treatment be given to the over-the-air broadcaster who uses tele-
phone lines to carry a signal from point of origination to transmitter? A last
major problem with this classification is that it depends on physical char-
acteristics while ignoring the true nature of the communication. Clearly it is
arguable that over-the-air broadcasters can be described as bringing com-
munications into the home by wire. While such a "wire" may not be physical,
it is nevertheless a "line" of communication. 54  It therefore seems unreason-
able to use the physical characteristic of the wire to differentiate between two
almost identical means of communication which -perform the same function
and, in many instances, carry the same information.
By arguing that it cannot be classified with telephone, the cable industry
argues by implication that whatever its class for taxing purposes, over-the-
air broadcasters must be included. This gives rise to a situation sometimes
referred to as under-inclusion. The effect of under-inclusion is to impose a
burden on a person in a manner which, while it may further a legitimate
purpose of the state, does not impose the same burden on other persons who
are similarly situated.
53. A parallel argument in both copyright cases, cited note 10 supra, was that if a
cable system "performed" the over-the-air signals it carried, then so did a master an-
tenna system, thereby making the owner of the building liable for copyright violations.
The apparent ridiculousness of such a result appears to have made a significant impact
in the CATV system owners' favor. In Fortnightly, the Court discussed this analogy:
If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and
installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be "performing"
the programs he received on his television set. The result would be no differ-
ent if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same pur-
pose. The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system
is erected and owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.
392 U.S. at 400. In its decision, the Teleprompter Court quoted this language with
approval. 415 U.S. at 408.
54. Cf. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.C.C. 315 (1944); MacKay Radio & Tel. Co.,
6 F.C.C. 562 (1938). This concept is incorporated in the Communications Act in the
subchapter relating to common carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1970).
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The Supreme Court has been ambivalent in its general acceptance of the
under-inclusion argument. It has voided a statute requiring defendants who
were sentenced to jail to repay the cost of a transcript which the state had
furnished, 55 but has sustained other types of under-inclusion because of ad-
ministrative convenience even though the impact of the statute was more
harsh upon certain members of the same class than upon others. 6 Neverthe-
less, when under-inclusion occurs, the state must advance persuasive
reasoning to justify it.57 Since television is a vital and important
medium of communication, the state should be required to sustain a heavy
burden when the effect of under-inclusion discriminates against the growth
and development of a new and more accessible type of television communica-
tion, while overlooking a substantial and legitimate part of the state's tax
base.
Cable's victory under an equal protection argument is hardly assured.
Among other things, it will require considerable evidence regarding the simi-
larity in nature, function, and equipment of cable and over-the-air broadcast-
ing. The outcome will also depend heavily on both the particular statute and
the overall taxing scheme of the state. That cable should not be penalized
because it is a new or unique medium of broadcast is for the system to dem-
onstrate with comprehensible and persuasive evidence.
B. The Commerce Clause
The degree to which the commerce clause affects a state's ability to tax
interstate commerce is far from clear. Until the late 1930's, the Supreme
Court took a straight-line approach in cases in which states attempted to tax
communications companies engaged in interstate commerce. It was uni-
formly held that a state tax levied against gross receipts derived from inter-
state commerce was in violation of the commerce clause. 58  Thus, among
those taxes voided were an occupation tax on telephone instruments used for
both interstate and intrastate messages, 59 a tax on the privilege of owning a
radio receiving set,60 and a tax on the revenue a radio station derived from
the sale of advertising. 61
55. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
56. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); ci. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
57. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
58. See, e.g., New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U.S. 338 (1930).
59. See Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935).
60. See Station WBI, Inc. v. Poulnot, 46 F.2d 671 (E.D.S.C. 1931).
61. See Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
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This straight-line approach ended, however, with Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue,62 in which the Supreme Court upheld a state tax which
was measured by the gross receipts -a magazine publisher derived from adver-
tising revenues. The decisions in Western Live Stock, and two later cases,
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. 63 and Freeman v. Hewit,6 4
stand as the principal decisions defining the present relationship between the
commerce clause and state taxation of interstate commerce.
Although the magazine in Western Live Stock had both an interstate and
intrastate circulation, the Court felt that the burden on interstate commerce
generated by the New Mexico tax was not sufficient to void the tax.65  To
arrive at this result, the Court created what has been called the "multiple
burden test" which purports to measure the validity of a tax by determining
if a similar tax could be imposed "with equal right by every state which the
commerce touches."1a6 The lack of the possibility of such a multiple tax led
the Court to uphold the tax in Western Live Stock.
Rather than overrule prior decisions that voided similar taxes when the risk
of a multiple tax burden was minimal or nonexistent, the Court sought to
harmonize these decisions. For example, it explained the decision in Fisher's
Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Commission 7 with the rationale that "[i]f
broadcasting could be taxed, so also could reception."'68 This explanation is
not sound if the "multiple burden" refers to duplicate taxes on the same re-
ceipts, however, since -the station's entire operation was confined to a single
state and there was no suggestion that because its radio waves reached into
other states a sufficient nexus was present to allow the other states to tax the
station's gross receipts. If, on the other hand, -the Court were addressing the
possibility of multiple taxation on the process of interstate communication,
such as a gross receipts tax on the sender and a use tax on the receiver, then
it is meaningful to explain Fisher's Blend in terms of the multiple burden test,
and the Court's discussion of Fisher's Blend in Western Live Stock is ap-
plicable to cable communication today.
Since the signals it carries can originate locally or across the country,6 9 it
is clear that a cable television system is engaged in interstate commerce. It
62. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
63. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
64. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
65. 303 U.S. at 259.
66. Id. at 256.
67. 297 U.S. 650 (1936). In Fisher's Blend, the court voided a state occupation tax
which was measured by the gross receipts from radio broadcasting of stations within the
state.
68. 303 U.S. at 260.
69. See note 34 supra.
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therefore would seem possible to attack attempts to tax both the system and
its viewers as precisely the multiple burden described in the Fisher's Blend
situation. Another multiple burden possibility with direct applicability 'to
cable systems today stems from the new technology that permits systems in
two different areas to join together to share the same program origination
simultaneously via a microwave connection.70 If the two systems are in dif-
ferent states, a side effect of this technology would be to allow each state
to tax gross receipts derived from the sale of the same programming. While
it is true that the taxes would be imposed upon two different systems, the
liability would stem from simultaneous use of the same product. This may
not be precisely the multiple tax envisioned in Western Live Stock, but it
does appear to be a possible application of the doctrine in the context of a
new technology.
The Court's decision in Berwind-White, which sustained a tax levied
directly on gross receipts derived from interstate sales, destroyed the last
vestige of a straight-line approach in applying the commerce clause to taxation
in such instances. The case, however, did not bury forever ,the original rule
that interstate commerce cannot be directly taxed. While the tax at issue in
the case was not such a -tax, Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority,
noted that there was still a prohibition against state taxation that could be
".the instrument of impeding or destroying interstate commerce."'"
The opinion in the Freeman case, which voided an Indiana tax on receipts
from the sale of stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange as too direct
a burden on interstate commerce, referred to both the Western Live Stock
and Berwind-White decisions and served to modify somewhat the impact of
the two cases by suggesting greater emphasis on case-by-case analysis. The
Court noted that the multiple burden test was extremely difficult to apply
and was not limited to situations in which multiple taxes had been applied,
but was fully applicable when a possibility of such taxation existed. 72 The
Court also dismissed the suggestion that the Berwind-White decision allowed
states "one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of com-
merce."
73
The divergent results of the great wealth of litigation concerning state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce, and these three cases in particular, are incon-
clusive. While once -there were too few approaches to the complex question
70. For a discussion of the technology involved in such a system, see CABLE TELEVI-
SION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE TELEVISION INTERCONNECTION (1974).
71. 309 U.S. at 48.
72. 329 U.S. at 256-57.
73. Id. at 256.
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of striking the balance between a state's right to tax and the prohibition
against allowing the several states to unduly burden interstate commerce,
there now may be ,too many. The only conclusions that can be drawn with
any certainty are that companies engaged in interstate commerce are not
thereby immune from bearing their fair share of local taxes74 and that the
company seeking immunity under !the commerce clause has the burden of
establishing the exemption. 75  As the Court noted in Freeman, "especially
in this field opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and
as ,the product of preoccupation with their special facts."176
As with equal protection arguments, then, the form and structure of the
state or local tax structure is critical in evaluating the chances of success in
seeking to have a tax declared invalid as a violation of the commerce clause.
The courts have upheld property taxes measured by gross or net income, par-
ticularly when they are imposed in lieu of other taxes. 77 So, too, have they
allowed franchise taxes when those taxes are measured by income or levied
in lieu of other taxes, 78 although these same taxes have been struck down
when determined to be privilege taxes. 79  And finally, even when individual
taxes may be valid, if the cumulative result is an overly oppressive burden,
one or more of the taxes may fall.80
In arguing that a tax singly or cumulatively burdens interstate commerce,
it should be remembered that when the courts speak of such burdens they
appear to focus on the point at which the liability arises rather than the ac-
tual burden imposed on the taxpayer. The consequent effect of the tax upon
the cable system's ability to do business also should be of substantial impor-
tance in determining whether commerce is burdened. The cable industry is
capital intensive with most of its dollars spent up front before the system is
even sure that there exists a market for its service. Economics dictate that
construction must continue even though customer acceptance lags because
under many cable franchises, the company is obligated to build all of its
74. See, e.g., General Motors v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439 (1964).
75. See, e.g., Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951).
76. 329 U.S. at 252.
77. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918); United States
Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912). But see Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), in which the Court invalidated as a "privilege tax" an
alleged property tax assessed on the going concern value of a business.
78. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
79. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
80. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936) (dictum);
Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1959); cf. Meyer v. Wells, Fargo &
Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912), in which there was already an ad valorem property tax, and a
gross receipts tax was voided.
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franchised area regardless of whether there is a demand for such service. And
because its competition with over-the-air broadcasters is so stiff, cable does
not have the luxury of adding to its services as demand increases. It must
go on the air initially with as much importation and origination as possible.
Because the type of service cable generally offers is nonessential, the suc-
cess of the system is not assured. With substantial start-up costs plus the
severe financial pressures of continued construction and marketing, it is not
unusual for systems, depending on their size, to wait five years or more before
beginning to break even. Any tax, regardless of whether it is imposed on
the system or the viewer, makes the service less desirable, slows down mar-
keting, diverts cash, impairs the system's ability to meet its budget projec-
tions, and weakens the company's financial underpinnings.
Nor can the company automatically pass this cost on to its customers. A
telephone company can go to its local utility commission and demonstrate
how increasing taxes are eroding its rate of return. A broadcaster has the
discretion, tempered by competitive conditions, of increasing its advertising
rates. But many states have little or no state-wide rate regulation of cable.
Rather, the system is left to the distinctly political task of returning to the
local municipal board which granted its franchise to try to obtain a rate
increase. 8 The company is put in the awkward position of asking elected
officials -to increase the expenses of their own constituency. Political expe-
diency, coupled with a general lack of ratemaking expertise in these local
bodies, puts the outcome of such a request very much in doubt. The effect
of the procedure can place the growth of a national communications system
at the whim of local political bodies.
Even if a rate increase is granted, economic factors would limit the extent
to which the tax could -be passed on lo customers; -the demand for cable tele-
vision is much more elastic than that for gas or electric service. There is a
point at which people will either cancel or not buy cable because it is sim-
ply too expensive. Local taxation places the system right in the middle of
an unpleasant dilemma: it must either absorb the tax, which may be impos-
sible, or pass it on to customers and take the substantial risk of a drop in
subscriptions. Either way, the system has a difficult task and the resulting
burden on interstate commerce is evident.
The weapons with which a cable system can fight to invoke the commerce
clause will be found only partially in law books. The most potent weapons
will be budget figures, cash flow projections, market studies, and penetration
81. See, e.g., N.Y. Exnc. LAw § 825 (McKinney Supp. 1974), which provides in
part: "such rates [as those specified in the franchise] may not be changed except by
amendment of the franchise."
[Vol. 24:755
Local Taxation
rates. While the industry does not yet know a great deal about its customers,
why they buy or what they like, cable nevertheless must educate the courts
about the economics of its business. The trial record must be effective and
imaginative, demonstrating in detail the financial and marketing problems of
making a system viable as well as the oppressive consequences of the chal-
lenged tax. In this way, cable's nature and potential can be translated into
the kind of hard evidence against which a court can intelligently measure
application of the commerce clause.
C. Freedom o1 Speech
The probability of a cable system's success in trying to invoke the first
amendment as a shield against local taxation 2 is no greater, nor offers more
solace, than its chance of invoking either the equal protection or the com-
merce clause. But there are at least two, and perhaps three, facets of free
speech which apply to cable. Since the courts will ultimately balance the
right of local government to tax against ,the abridgement of free speech
which results, the more broadly applicable that cable can make its first
amendment argument, the greater its chance for relief.
One obvious application of the first amendment relates to the system's
ability to disseminate news, information and entertainment. Although its
method of dissemination, like that of broadcasters, depends upon electronic
and microwave transmission, it is nevertheless included in the press, whose
freedom is guaranteed by the first amendment.83  To the extent that local
taxes threaten to damage the system, free speech and dissemination of news
is thereby curtailed and abridged.
Another first amendment argument holds that people have a right to re-
ceive information.8 4 In metropolitan areas which have many media outlets,
the tax troubles of one cable system, or even its eventual loss, may not be
viewed as significant. But in rural areas where cable has its largest penetra-
tion,85 these systems may be the only means of communication available.
Loss or substantial retardation of such a system can substantially abridge the
ability of people to obtain information.
82. Although the prohibition against abridging the freedom of speech expressly ap-
plies to Congress, it has been applied to state and local governments through the four-
teenth amendment. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
83. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
84. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
85. See CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE DATA 2 (1974).
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The last argument, and the one which at this point is only speculative, in-
volves a constitutional right of access on behalf of the public to the facilities
of a cable system. The decisions in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC80
and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee 7
may have planted 'the seed for such a right by their recognition that such
an argument exists, but excessive local taxation will literally freeze that
seed before its slightest growth.
The first amendment is designed to preserve an "uninhibited marketplace
of ideas." 88 In furtherance of this purpose, the Supreme Court in Red Lion
held that the "personal attack" and "editorializing" regulations promulgated
by the FCC, 9 which grant certain members of the public a limited right to
broadcast time under specified circumstances, were not an abridgement of
the broadcasters' free speech.90
Stretching Red Lion to its limits, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held, in Business Executives Move for Viet-
nam Peace v. FCC,9' that under the first amendment broadcasters could not
refuse to sell time to various groups for editorial commercials. In effect, the
court gave every citizen a limited constitutional right of access to the broad-
cast media.9 2 The Supreme Court, however, reversed this holding in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee.9 3
Three Justices reasoned that no government action was involved in the broad-
casters' refusal, while three others opined that such a refusal was not a vio-
lation of the first amendment.9 4 Although Democratic National Committee
86. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
87. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
88. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
89. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1975).
90. 395 U.S. at 386-401.
91. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
92. To reach the conclusion that the refusal by the broadcasters violated the first
amendment, it was first necessary to establish that there was an element of state action
in the denial. The circuit court found the requisite state action in the extensive relation-
ship between the broadcasting industry and the federal government, 450 F.2d at 651,
and in specific government action involved in the case-namely, the FCC ban on edito-
rial advertising. Id. at 652. It followed, therefore, that because broadcasters were so
entwined with the government, their actions involved state action.
Chief Justice Burger, for himself, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, stated upon
reversing the circuit court's decision that the relationship between a television station
and the FCC was not sufficient to constitute state action. 412 U.S. at 114-21. This
opinion has received substantial criticism. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1972 Term,
87 HARV. L. REv. 55, 178-82 (1974).
93. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
94. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found no state action,
as discussed in note 92 supra, while Justice White concurring, 412 U.S. at 146, and
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did not overrule Red Lion, the Supreme Court did refuse, at least for the
present, to turn a public right of reply granted by the FCC fairness doctrine
into a constitutional right of access.
In both cases, the single characteristic of broadcasting that seems to have
had the most impact upon the Court's refusal to establish a constitutional right
of access was the lack of channel capacity available in over-the-air broadcast-
ing. The Court in Red Lion noted that this lack of capacity resulted in a
practical limitation upon the number of people who can have access to broad-
cast time.95 Read together, the two opinions reflect an attitude on the part
of the Court that traditional applications of the first amendment may not
automatically fit broadcasting's unique capabilities. There is a strong infer-
ence, however, that if the channel capacity of a broadcaster were larger,
then the Court might "posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast" 96 for the public.
Justices Blackmun and Powell separately concurring, 412 U.S. at 147, found no viola-
tion of the first amendment.
95. 395 U.S. at 388. Some of the language in Red Lion is so broad that it is rea-
sonable to speculate that if the FCC had not codified the fairness doctrine, the courts
eventually would have found such a doctrine mandated by a combination of the first
amendment and spectrum scarcity. One example of the sweeping nature of the argu-
ment occurs in the opinion of Justice White who, writing for the Court, stated:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write or publish ...
* , * Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is per-
mitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be
expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their inter-
est in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium func-
tion consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
395 U.S. at 388, 390.
Chief Justice Burger expressed similar thoughts on the impact of the scarcity of avail-
able frequencies in Democratic National Committee when he wrote:
With broadcasting, where the available means of communication are limited in
both space and time, the admonition of Professor Alexander Meiklejohn that
"[wlhat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said" is particularly appropriate.
412 U.S. at 122, quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1948).
96. 412 U.S. at 101, quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388
(1969). In the Democratic National Committee opinion, Chief Justice Burger took note
of cable's potential importance in providing greater channel capacity, stating:
Conceivably at some future date Congress or the Commission-or the broad-
casters-may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practi-
cable and desirable. Indeed, the Commission noted in these proceedings that
the advent of cable television will afford increased opportunities for the discus-
sion of public issues.
412 U.S. at 131.
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Recognizing that cable can make a permanent contribution to the market-
place of ideas, FCC regulations mandate such access by requiring cable sys-
tems to provide at least one free access channel97 and one or more leased
access channels.9 8 The system must also promulgate operating rules for the
channels9" and be prepared to expand their number as channel capacity
grows. 100 Thus if taxes eat away at the limited capital of developing systems,
they are also impairing the ability of the systems to provide a public broad-
cast forum.
In analyzing cable's chances of success with the various first amendment
arguments, it is important to note that few cases have dealt directly with the
effect of taxation upon a free press. In the leading case of Grosjean v.
American Press Co.,'01 the Supreme Court voided a tax against a newspaper
which the taxing statute itself described as "a license tax for the privilege
of engaging in [the selling of advertising] in this State.' 0 2 Similar privilege,
occupational or license taxes have generally not fared well in the courts be-
cause of their burden on interstate commerce; the Court in Grosjean also
made clear that such taxes are not favored when they are imposed in a direct
manner on the exercise of free speech.' 03 It is important to realize, however,
that the Court took notice of the historical misuse of the particular tax in
Grosjean as a tool to suppress free speech, for this had a significant impact
on the decision. 10 4
Nevertheless, if a cable system were to face a tax described by the taxing
authority as a license or privilege tax which is tied to the number of customers
in a system, Grosjean will stand as strong precedent for overturning such a
levy. In ,addition, the Grosjean Court described the appropriate test in
measuring a first amendment violation which could be of particular help
to a cable system: the Court noted that it was not only complete cen-
97. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251(a)(4) (1975) provides:
Each such system shall maintain at least one specially designated, noncommer-
cial public access channel available on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis.
The system shall maintain and have available for public use at least the mini-
mum equipment and facilities necessary for the production of programming for
such a channel.
98. Id. § 76.251(a)(7).
99. Id. § 76.251(a)(11).
100. Id. § 76.251(a)(8).
101. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
102. Id. at 240.
103. Id. at 250.
104. "LThe tax] is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting,
it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the cir-




sorship that was forbidden, but "any action of the government by means
of which it might prevent . . . free and general discussion of public
matters."' 05 This statement was limited to exclude a prohibition against "the
ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government,"' 0 6 so a cable sys-
tem seeking to rely on Grosjean would need to establish that the tax in ques-
tion was not ordinary. One possible approach to establish the character of
the tax might be similar to that discussed as an equal protection argument,10 7
that a tax on a cable system as a disseminator of news information and the
public view without a similar tax against over-the-air broadcasters and news-
papers should not be classified as normal or ordinary. Additionally, since
cable is the only medium that provides effective public access, selective taxa-
tion can only thwart such access and thereby violate the first amendment.
Under normal circumstances, local taxation, if it impinges upon free speech
at all, does so only indirectly. When a court is faced with an indirect
abridgment of free speech, it must balance such abridgment against the
state's right to tax.'08 Numerous courts have emphasized that the power to
tax is the power to destroy; l09 inherent in taxation is the risk that it may
be used to oppress. Taxes valid when levied can be increased to a point
that they exceed not only the state's constitutional authority, but become a
means of control. Cable is not only a more enticing target for local taxation
than over-the-air broadcasters but also, at this stage in its development, a
much easier one to hit.
If the balance is a delicate one between the state's right to tax and abridg-
ment of speech, equally delicate is the ability of the cable system to survive
too heavy a tax burden. Cable is an innovative form of communication. It
will be up to the cable system to convince the courts that the kinds of taxes
imposed on cable have a direct and lasting impact on the public's ability and
right to use this new medium.
III. CONCLUSION
That the tone of this article is not overly optimistic about the chances of
105. Id. at 249-50, quoting 2 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (8th ed.
1927).
106. Id. at 250.
107. See p. 762 supra.
108. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950),
in which the Court described the balancing required:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the
duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests de-
mand the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
Id. at 399.
109. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936).
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defining suitable litigation strategy for cable under -the Constitution is not
so much the reflection of an attitude as a refraction caused by the com-
plexity and seriousness of the issues involved. Very few constitutional
problems are susceptible of easy or quick opinion and there is nothing about
cable's problems ,that makes it any different.
If it is possible for an industry to have an identity crisis, cable is such an
industry. Taking that crisis into the courtroom will render its constitutional
arguments confusing, inconsistent, and ultimately insufficient. Cable is a
unique service with untapped and perhaps unimagined potential. To cloak
itself with the protections afforded by the Constitution, it must educate and
enlighten the courts about its technology, economics and function. While ap-
plication of equal protection, the commerce clause and the first amendment
are interrelated, they are not necessarily interdependent. They do, however,
uniformly require that cable establish the nature of its business.
The FCC itself has already expressed its willingness to appear as amicus
in any constitutional challenge brought by cable which it deems to be an
"appropriate action.""10 Such help can go a long way towards establishing a
permanent identity for cable and the place envisioned for it in a national
communications system.
110. CATV Taxes 466. The Commission went beyond this position to suggest that
if "those interested parties not be forthcoming, it may be incumbent upon this Commis-
sion to consider . . . direct recourse to the judicial process." Id. (footnote omitted).
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